Breakaway Unions: an Australian Case by Teicher, Julian
New Zraland journal o.l industrial relation.\. 19H6. II. 149- '159 
ARTICLES 
Breakaway unions: an Australian case 
Julian Teicher* 
Thi~ paper e.xcnnine.\ the concept o.f breakaway unions and place~ it u·ithin the A ustra/ian 
in.\titutional co111ext. The concept is then applied to a panicular case involving pol·t'er ._\·uaion 
opera ton;, a g1~oup ojH·hich seceded jron1 one union and n1ergecl u·ith another while retaining their 
group auranon1y. This so1ne1rhar 110\'e/ approach to circtonventing the consrraints of registration 
under the ·Conciliation and Arbitration Act highl(r{hts the liluitations of industl)' style unions in 
rc!pre.\enring a dil,erse 1nen1ber:;hip. 
Introduction 
Although A u~tral ia ha~ a Ia rge n u n1 her of unions this does not i n1 p'ly that'~ orkers hHve the 
right to choose het\\·een unions or to create unions of their O\\ n choosing. At the federal 'le\ el 
the legislalive fratne\vork is specifically designed to ·•ninin1isc duplication of union coverage. 
l ·he vehicle ,~·hereby this object is achieved is the process of fedcra 'l registration. Registration 
enlails an attetnpt to vest unions ·with rnut.ually ~exclusive coverage rights \Vilh the boundaries 
between unions usually being defined in occupational tenns. 1 The principal attractions of 
registration are threefold. First unions are freed from the necessity to engage in costly and 
difficult struggles \vith en1ployers for recognition. Having gained recognition. however~ a 
union cannot compel an en1ployer to negotiate. Second. if negotiations are unsuccess~ul a 
union can activate the processes of co~11pulsory concilia·tion and arbitration with the 
outcon1e (award) being legally binding.- 1 .. hi:rd. registration in1plies that cn1ployees arc 
unlikely to be abJe to exercise a choice behveen unions. thereby guaranteeing registered 
unions a core n1en1bership and an associated revenue flovJ. Th .is rnay be further augn1ented as 
a result of various union security devices arrived at through arbitral processes or collective 
negotiations. 
The protection afforded to registered unions fron1 con1pctitors and antagonistic eJn players 
is not only a n1ajor attraction of federal registration: it is a key reason for the continued 
existence of a large nun1ber of unions (HO\\'ard. 1980. pp 84-R9). l-Ienee, in 1979. there \vere 328 
unions with the nun1ber fa'lling to 319 in 1983 and rising to 329 in 1984. At Decen1ber 1984. 149 
of these unions were federally registered and th.ey repfesented 82 percent of all union 
n1ernbers (Australian Bureau ofStatist.ics. 1984). Significantly. the nun1erical don1inance of 
fedcr.aHy registered unions has been achieved despite the disinclination or failure of 
successive industrial registrars to define exclus·ive coverage rights for registered un·ions. 
Indeed. it ha .., been suggested (Hov.'ard. 1980. pp 86) that the ~arty industrial registrars 
sonh~li 1nes exercised a di cretion not to grant exclusive rights of.<:overage in order to effect one 
of the n1ajor objectives of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act ··to encourage the 
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:In prinl·iple . both indu~try anu occupation.tl unions arc r~gi~tcrahle . however. in practice. rnost 
registered union" u re of th c occu pa 1 ion a It) pc. An organisation\ el igi hi I ily or con~t 1lu't ion ru te i' the 
priucip.d source of .ib capadt) to recruit and reprc!o,ent the industrial intcJe'\tS or n1~n1bers. An 
organi,ation ·~ industry rule ten(h to reinlon:e tht? co,eragc spedlieu in the digihil .it~ ruk. SeeR' · 
Dunlop R uhher A us1ralta & Ors: e.\" pane Federated .\fiscellaneou.'\ H 'orker~ l.hnon ( 19~ 7 )· 
I he practil.·<tl ~ignificance of this 'lies l."hh .. 'll) in the capadty of union" to secure adherenc~ to the 
h:nn~ of an av.ard rather lh:tn the near n1orihund penal pro\·i~ion" relating to aw~ud breaches h~ 
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organi at ion of representative organi ation · of ernployl:rs and en1ployecs and their registra-
tion under the Act ... In part the duplication of coverage rights al ·o reflects Au tralia·. 
inheritance fron1 Britain of a structure of craft and occupational unions overlaid with a 
nun1her of 'large conglornenue occupational unions. That is. over tin1c techno1ogical and 
organisational changes have produced further overlaps :in union coverage rights a~ sorne 
skills vanish and others arc created. For exan1plc. in the shipbuilding industry the shift fron1 
tirnber to n1etal construction produced a longstanding den1arcation dispute bet\\een 
ship\\'rights and boil~rn1akcrs.' 
The nature of the registration process i · also centra '! to the suhjcc ~t ofbreaka\vay union . As 
con1n1only understood a union brcaka\vay i conslitutcd by the secession of a rninority 
interest group \vhich feel · unable to exerci l:: an innuence on union decision rnaking 
con1n1ensurate\vith it ~ perception of it~ sectional status and potential trength (Turner .. 1962. p 
~65). Typically uch rninorities are defined in tenn~ of occupation or ski]] and. alrnost hy 
definition. occur in large unions with a heterogeneou n1cn1bership.ln respect ofconglon1cratc 
occupational unions Lerner (1961. p 191) stres e~ the in1portance of occupational groups 
being ··able lo innuence decisions affecting their O\vn occupation ... This n1ay be diffi~ult to 
achieve in practice. because the in1petus to rnaintain established relativities rneans decisions 
relating to one group irnpact on n1os1 others. Whether a breakaway occurs. ho\vever. depends 
on a variety of factors. son1e of \Vhich are conditioned by the Australian systern of union 
regi tration . Usually a breakavt'ay \Vill be strongly opposed by ernployer and the relevant 
union. En1ployers recognise that brcaka\\'ays \\'i11 ahnost inevitably pursue in1proveu \\ages 
and conditions n1orc aggres ·ively than establisheu unions. Recognition of a breakav.CI) \Vould 
a:lso provoke indu trial reta'liation frorn other unions and a deterioration ofnorn1aJ induslrial 
relation proce e ·. Furthennorc tht: nature and exlent of union ·ecurity devices \VOuld affect 
the capaci'ly of a breaka\vay to recruit n1ernhcrs and achieve a financially \'iable size. The 
po ition of a breaka\vay union is further con1plicated hy the registration proct:SS \\ hich 
enables a regist.ered union to oppose an applicant on. an1ong other things. the ground that 
.. an organisation to \Vhich the rnetnbers of lh~ association rnight conveniently belong has 
already been registcred ... 4 Although the objectors ·rnay uhiinatcly fail. their opposition can 
succeed indirectly by necessitat ·ing a costly and prolonged series of legal proceeding · \Vhich 
fe\v ne\vly fonned organis,ttiuns '~roulcl have the resource~ to \Vithstand. 
l ·he institutional features discussed above are in1portant innuenccs on the conduct and 
character of Australian unions. The prorninence of arbitral procc~dings and the exten~i\e 
latutory regulation of union conduct tends to produce organisation~ \Vhich are highly 
centrali "ed. Dispute set fling and <1\\·ard rna king de\ olvc to\vard full-tin1c officials\\ ith . hop 
noor organisation typically re1naining undeveloped. There are notable exception like the 
An1aJgan1ated Metal Workers Union and the Building Worker Industrial l lnion (Davis. 
1977. pp 357-60: Davis. 19R3. pp 212-14). ·Generally a nun1bcr of unions \Viii have coverage 
rights in a particular industry and in respect of a particular group of\\'Orkcr .. these rights n1ay 
overlap. Two possibilities flov~' fron1 this: workers have a choice of union or the overlap is a 
source of inter-union conflict. ln the latter case. dual union n1en1bership is a solution 
son1etirnes adopted. Con11nonly. federal registration and union security arrangen1cnt. 
con1bine to deny workers a choice of union and 1nay in1ply n1cn1bership of a union in which 
their interest is a n1inority vie\\'. It is argued above. ho\vever1 that there is little scope for such a 
group to secede and forn1 a federally regi tered union . An alternative is to 1nerge \Vith an 
existing union as occurred in the Victorian po,ver indu "'try. 
In lht: \ ' ictorian pO\ver industry there i a n1uhiplicity of unions although. for the rnost part. 
a \VOrker·s classification preclude " any choice of union . Po\vcr station operators arc the 
cxc,ept·ion \Vith 'the Au "'tralian In ·titute of Marine and Po\ver Engint!ers (A1~1PE). tht! 
Federated Engine Driver and Firernen·s Association (1- I: I)FA) and the ~1unicipal Officers 
3 In 1974 the 2 unions concerned. the l·edcnHed Ship\\ rights and Ship Construl:tor~ A~,o~iation nnd 
the Amalgarnated rvtctal ~Vorkcrs l ~ nion. amalgarnalcd hut it is not dear whe1ther thl· demarcation 
1 in e con t i n u e s w i 1 h i n l h c m l: rg e d u n i u n . 
4 Th·e \Vnrd:-. of section 142 ()f the Cuncili:ttion and Arbitration Act rcrer to the convenil'ncc of the 
Conciliation and Arhi tra lion Con11n iss ion in fu I filling ils ·ta tu I OJ)' function of prcven ti ng a nc.J 
!'\Cll'ling disputes and not 1lhc convenience or a particular union or the Industrial RcgistiCu . . cc 
A u.,tralian Railways Union v. National Union of Raih1·ayn1en of A u.\lralia (I 93.3). 
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As ociation (M,OA) having overlapping coverage rights.'\ ln practice there \\'aS little effective 
choice until the late 1970!\. l-iistoricaUy. AIMPE \va.s only 1narginally involv~d in the pO\\Cr 
indu~B)'. providing continuing representation for ex-n1arinc cnginc\!r~: M ~OA hus provided 
representation for a hctcrog~encous range or·'stafr· (\vhitc-collar) classifications and FED FA 
n:prc~cn ted a si 1n i I a rl y d iversc ra ngc or·\vag~e~ ·· (hI uc-co'lla r) class i fi cation ·~. l'h rough i·ts Sta IT 
Sub-branch Fki)FA ah;o represented 'the Jo,~·cr rank~ of the operator classifications. having 
exclusive coverage ofunil attendants. but it ha~ gcneraHy failed to rccruil at the stafflc\'el. Thi~ 
led to the 'ast 1najority of operators joining the MOA. Q\ ,Cr tirnc. the MOA"s stance on a 
nur11h~rofi~sLH~~.led n1any oprrators to vie\~ it a~ unrepn:!\entath·c of their intcrc ts. FEOl-A. 
a~ a union predorninantl) r~pre~cntati\c or \\age~ en1plo)ccs. \'dts c4ual'ly unacceptable. 
AlMPL~ .. hO\\evcr. offered a solution "· hich enabled participalion in the federal indus'lrial 
relation~ !\)~t~nl \\ilhout the lin1itation!\ inherent in holding a n1inority vie\\'. Although 
federally r~gistered. AIMPE offered the operators organisational autonon1y through the 
creation of a Latrobe Vall~) Sub-branch\\ ith n1en1bcr~hip restricted to the supcr\'isory group 
in the State Electricity C'ornn1ission of\' ictoria (SECV) of '\\ hich 'lht: operator!' \vere a n1ajor 
con1poncnt . 
The c·in:un1stance surrounding the creation or a l1reak&:l\\·ay union. '~' hich Lircurnventcd 
the ~onstraints :inTposcd by Aust:rnlia·s national indu~trial relation~ syst~n1. is the subjecl of 
this paper. l~he ~t:xposition proce.cds in ~ stages: an exan1ination of the sources of 
db~ati ·sfaclion of the operators and an account of 2 aln1o~t idcntica 'l disputes \\'hich \Vere 
central to the occurrence of a breaka\\ay . 
• 
Determinants of militancy among the o:perators 
The SE~CV po,~·er station operator~ arc stafflahour and as such have traditionally received 
superior conditions of en1ployn1ent to n1ost other SE(~V en1ployces. 1 n turn they are expected 
lo excn:i~c high levels of skill and r~sponsibility. being charged \Vith the safe operation. 
n1aintcnance and repair of the co1nplex and volat.ile equip1nent constituting a po\ver slation. 
Notwithstanding their special position. the operators have exhibited an orie-ntation to 
unioni~n1 and an industrial tnilitancy \vhich is surprising at first sight. l 'hcre is. hov~'ever. a 
gro~'ing literature directed to expla,ining th ·is phenornenon6 (for ~exarnplc. Griffin. 1985). The 
factors \Vh ich appear to be centra I to the present case are 'the strategic location and the relati\ e 
deterioration in the \Vages and condition of the operators. 
The technological and social organisation ofpo\ver station has n1cant that operator .. are 
\\C1l placed for engaging in industrial ac'lion. \Vhile the irnposition of \VOrk ban ha~ 
in11nediatc and drastic consequences. ~uch action i readil) r~ver iblc if contined to 
reduct.ions in generating load. ~Over tin1e thi s leverage has been enhanced hy the increas·ing 
capacity of generating units. l J n t·il 1961. the largest generali ng set in the Latrobe Ya Uey \\'as 20 
rnega,vatts hut the con1n1i sioning of 't' allourn l: in lhal year increased this figure to 120 
n1ega\vatts . l~he con11nissioning of 1-Jazehvood Pov,,er Station het\\'een 1962 and 1969 brought 
011 stn:anl R generating units of:!OO n1ega\Va'tts.l~ his '\Vas rollo\ved by the COI1111l 'iS ioning ofthe 
) ' allourn W pO\\'Cr station \v·ith ~ 350 n1cga\vau uni :ts and 2 375 111Cgl:nvatt units. Most recently. 
in 19R4. the first of4500 rnega,vatl uni'l~ V.'Cre con1n1issioned at the Loy )' ang pov.'erstation. A. 
po\ver stations becon1e larger and n1ore technologically advan~cd lhc electricity supply 
. yslenl is rendered n1ore vulnerable to industrial disruption. l .his vulnerahilily ·is further 
increa~ed by the gradual centralLation of generating capacity in fhc Latrobe \ ' alley. 
These technological factors are con1plen1ented by the kill specificit) oft he operator . For 
exan1ple. because Hazehvood po\ver slation \vas con1n1is ioned O\Cr a nun1bcr of years. the 
control roon1s ofthe 8 units differ sub tanlially and n1ost operators are qualified in relation to 
a particu 'lar unit Like\vise. operators cannot shift frorn one po\~'er station to another \\'ithout 
further training. Typica11y. hO\\'evcr.operators retnain SECYen1ployecs fora n1ajorportion of 
their ~'orking Jives. being trained and retrained for successively higher positions or other 
positions at a sirnilar level. l'he IO\V subslitutability or skills specificity of lhe operators 
5 l-or a n1or~ detailed discu sion or the' .triou. unions in\oh~d in the po\\er inJustry see an earlier 
paper h) the author (TeiLhcr. 19XO. pp 316-20). 
6 The notion of a \erie' of ahernatJ\c form~ of exprcs"ing indu"trial (Onllicl i" l.'O n1n1on in the 
... od(,logil'alliten:aturl· on inuu~trial relation": ""c for exarnplc: R l-l}llHin ( llJ72 p 57). 
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contributes ignificantly to their trategic position. This v.'a graphically illustrated during the 
19RO shifl\vork dispute \Vhen the Victorian Govcrnrnent announced it would invoke the 
Es· ential Services Act enahl'ing deployn1ent of non-SECV labour to operate the power 
stations~ the Governnl'ent 'lat.er conceded lhis was not feasible (Australian. 1980. I). An 
irnportant corollary of the operators' skill specificity is that labour turnover does not provide 
an alternative to overt expressions of industrial connict. Thus~ survey .findings suggest that 
operators perceive then1selves as trapped into SECV shift \VOrk but this perception partly 
rctlects both reliance on penalty payn1cnts to augn1ent fa1nily incon1e and the ab ence of 
pron1otional prospects. 1 n their response to a 1982 survey queslionnaire. T2 percent of 
shift·,vorkers believed it \vould he difficult or in1po ~ ible to get a transfer to day\\'Ork but only 
II percent had ever applied for a transfer. Arnong shift,vorkcrs at large. 74 percent would 
tran fer to day\vork if they could obtain equivalent pay. In the staff classifications only :!9 
percent reported having received pron1otion corn pared to 43 percent of da)T\\'Orker 
(Green\vood. 1982. p 63). 
l'he technological a1~d organisational features of the po\ver stations endow the operators 
\Vith considerable bargaining ]10\\'er. Significantly. the probability of it being exercised is 
increased by the organisational features of pov;cr stations. First. because of techno1ogica1 
advances the duties of the operators are increasingly centred on vigilance \\'ith fe\ver directly 
operational tasks pcrfonncd. Periods of activity are ~losely related to n1alfunctions. indicated 
by sophisticated ala nn systen1s. or routine n1a intena nce.l'h us. there are typically long periods 
of passive \VOrking tin1e. Se(.;ond. the operator in each control roon1 of the unitised povlcr 
. tations. Haze)\\'OOd. 'l"allourn \\' and no\v Loy '\' an g. constitute a sn1all team: for exan1ple. at 
Hazehvood po\ver station there are 2 generating unit · for each ~tage and lhe tean1 i con1posed 
of2 unit controllers. 4 assistant unit controllers and 4 unit attendants. Third. because of the 
erratic and inconv~enient hour o:f',vork · hift,vorkcr tend to have very restricted fan1ily and 
~ocial lives. In the Latrobe Valley. \vith the exception ofin1 n1ediate fan1ily. shift\\'Orkers· social 
relalionships are n1ostly confined to fcllO\V SECV shift\\'Orkcrs. This contention receives son1e 
suppot1 fron1 recent findings that ?.7 percent of h·ift,vorker reported .. n1ost or aU of their 
friends·· \vere shifl\vorkers and this percentage increased 'V\1ith age (Greenvlood. 1982. p 64). 
1 nsofar as these friends are co-\vorkers it is expected that pcrcept·ions fanned in the \Vorkplacc 
\Vill be reinforced. 
Thus. it n1ay be concluded then the organisational features ofpo,ver lations reinforce the 
social cohesion oft he \VOrk group and facilitate expression of grievances. Moreover. there arc 
few group of SECV ctnployees as strategically placed a the operator to disrupt electricity 
supplies. Such is the pO\\'er of the operators that in the 1980 shiftwork dispute. industrial action 
brought inlnlediatepo\verrcslriction". By contra tin the 11-\vcck n1aintenance,vorker strike 
of 1977 re triction \Vere not i rn po ed until the latter "'tage. of the .. toppage (Benson and Goff. 
'1979. p 225). De pite lheir strategic location. the operator.., \VCrc industrially quiescent until 
1976. The imn1ediate cau es of tht: tran forn1ation " 'ere the erosion of \Va1!e relativities in a 
.... 
period of rapid.ly rising \\'age and extension of staff en1ploynu~nt condition. to the \\'ider 
SECV \VOrkforce. Related to these \Vas the apparent failure of the MOA to represent 
adequately the industrial inh:restsofth~ operators. This latter point is discussed extensively in 
the follo\ving section. 
T\'.'O events in the recent history of Australian \Vagc fixation are l.:entralto the deteriorating 
" 'age relativity oft he operator~: the introduction of the rninin1un1 \vage-total \vagc concept in 
1967 and the establishtnent of the systen1 of national \Vagc indcxat.ion in 1975. The n1otivation 
of the Conciliation and Arbit.ration Con1n1ission in both cases \\' ctS sin1 ·ilar~ to curtail an 
accelerating rate of \vagt: in nation. By the 1960s the ba ic \\'age had ceased to be a true 
rninitnun1 \\'age and \Vas a n1ajor part of all a\\'ard \\'age rate . hence lirniting the 
Con1n1is ian· capacity to increase the \vagc of the lo\vest paid \Vith rninin1al inflationary 
con equences. The creation of the n1initnun1 \vage \Vas designed t.o obviate that problen1 
(Niland and 1 aac. 1975. p '12). Jn the buoyant conditions of the J960 th .is did nol halt the 
inflationary srriral. Instead it fostered an incn::ased in~idence of collectively bargained \Vage 
rates. In addition~ on occasions the Cornrnission·s National \\'age Case decisions ru 'led that 
equity considerations nc~essitated recognition of the widespread incidence of over award 
pay1nents (Hancock. llJ75. pp 421-2). l)espitc this a~cornrnudation the Con1n1ission had 
becotne a vehicle for the spread of \vage rises and hy the early 1970s National Wage Case 
decisions operated as a third tier of\vage fixation btrilding on industry and local agrccn1ent . 
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l·he pattern of\\ age fixa lion in the period prcccd ing the i Ill rod uction or \\~age indexation 
in 1975 is rcnectcd in \\'age JllOVCJ11CI1t~ and relati\ ity l:hangcs in the sr:c·v. In ScptCinher 
1970 the" age rclativi ty bet\\ ccn a base grade fi ttcr and a rcprescn tativc opera tor classifi~a tion 
y.·as 51.3 percent and thereafter i l generally i ncreascd reaching 53.9 percent in1 n1cdiately prior 
to the introduction ofwage indexation in April1975. During the period 1972-'1974 erosion of 
the fitter-operator relativity occurred due to National Wage Case dec·isions resulting in 
increases which v.'ere nat rate or had a flat rate con1ponent. In add·ition. in Novcn1ber 1974, a 
$9 n1oven1cnt in the Metal Trades A\vard nowed into the operators award as a nat rate increase. 
l "he con1prc~~ion of relati\'itics \\aS further exacerbated b) ihc introduction of the State 
lncrcnlCntal PaynlCill~ SchcnlC (SIPS) in 1972 \Vhich increased the over ll\~ard paynl~nt~ or 
1nanual grade ctnplo)ees by 4.50. that is. fn.)nl 9.R to 11.4 percent of an Assistant LJnit 
( 'ontrollcr's n1inirnun1 \\age ratc.s The resultant relativit) con1prcssion has gencrall) been 
111aintained through sub~equcnt adjustn1ents to SIPS because the operators art.! covered hy a 
p a i d ra 1 c!) a n d not a 111 in i 111 u 111 ra t c s a\\ a rd. S t i II f u rt her d c t e rio ra lion i n the re 1 a t i' e po i ti on of 
1lhe operators occurred foliO\\ ing the C'onl Jll'ission ·s departure fronl run \\'age indexation in it~ 
National \Vag~ ( 'as\! decisions b~ginning \\'.ith the Man.:h quarter 1976 and ending \\ith the 
l)t.:ccnl her quarter 1977. Flat ra tc i ncrea scs \•lh ic h '~v~re in tcg ra I to pI a tea u i ndcxa lion b rough t 
u 2.4 pcrcenl increase in th~ fitter\ rci<Hivity to 56.3 percent in a period ,,.,hich corresponds \Vilh 
the shift,,.·ork dispute of 1976-77. 
The pressure placed on the operator·. r~lali\'e po~ition b) n1ctal industl)' \\'age n1ovc1nents. 
incr~ased over a\a.rard pa) n1cnts. and National \Vag,c Ca c decis·ions. \Va~ exacerbated by 
actual and i1npending che1ngcs in en1plo) n1enl conditions. Di · ... ati ·faction \Vi'th continuing 
differential bct\\Cen staff and \\'ages en1plo)ccs \Vas r~n~ctcd in a logofclairn .. prepared hy 
Latrobe Valle) shop ste\vards in Janual") 1977. Along \vith increa ed \vagcs. the) denu1ndcd 
that condition ofen1ployn1ent of,,agc~ cn1ployees be increased lo achieve parit) ~'ith '~ taff 
crnplo)~C~ (Ben on and Goff. 1979. p 211 ). Later that year the failure of negotiations resulted 
in a prolonged strike h) tnaintenance \\'Orkers. Although the stoppag,e brought only n1inor 
i1nprovcrnenl!\ in wages it "et in train a proce s entailing further erosion of the relative 
position of operators and other staff. Arguably. the n1aintenance \VOrkers strike '~'as the 
prin1ary ~onsideration underlying \Vhat has been descr·ibcd as the ·~sEc,·v·s desire to tnove 
lO\\' a nJs u n i forn1 ity of non \vages conditions .. ( l)evries. 19S3~ p 270). :During 1 97X there \Vas an 
in1proven1cnt in sick leave entitlen1ent~ and an upgrading of the (Wages) En1ployee 
Retircn,ent and Benefit Fund ''as under consideration. Subscqu~ntly there have been 
in1pro\en1ents in the Retiretnent Fund and sick lca\'e as \vell as reductions in hour .. of\\'Ork. 
The differential conditions ofSEC'\1 sta(fand \vages en1ployees are evidenced by the fal:t 
that lhe Rctiren1ent Fund \Vas note tab11shed until 1970 and hitherto \Vages cn1ployees 
r~ceived a gratuity based on year~ of service. Since 1977 benefits p"tyablc fron1 the Retiren1ent 
Fund have been in1provcd 'in rclati\'e tcnns. ln respect of ick leave entitlcrnenls. there has 
been a progres i\e narro,ving of inequalities and after altenrtions in Man.:h 1980 the onl) 
difference bel\vecn the 2 groups ~'aS the cntitlcn1ent on engagcn1ent 12 shifts for tafT and 5 '~or 
\vagt:s en1ployees. Follo\ving the 19RO shift,vork dispute that gap ~urthcr tlirninished \Vith 
~ages crnployees rec,eiving 8 shift on engagen1ent. l)·ifferential hours of \VOrk are also a 
consideration and until 1981 \1\ag·es ernployces '~'orkcd a 40 hour 'Neck and staff'. a 3X.5 hour 
\\'Cck. Thi~ difference \vas one that lhc n1aintenance \Vorkers sought to abolish in '1977~ and by 
early 1980 it had becorne a principal concern oflh~ An1algan1ated Metal \~' orkers Un·ion and 
other unions repre ~enting ''ages en1ployee . The conduct oft hi~ can1paignneatly O\ erlap the 
19{ 0 hift\\Ork dispute. \\ith Latrobe Valley ~hop sh~\\'ards receiving reports fr0111 officials of 
the Australian Council ofTrade Union and the Victorian Trade~ Hall ( 'ouncil on 2~ April 
and deciding to conduct a separate shorter hour~ can1paign fron1 that in Australian industt; 
general)} . Detailed negotiations \Vith the SEC'V con1n1enccd in August and resulted in the 
introduction of a 37.5 hour \\'eek/9 day fortnight for all SEC~\, ernployce~ in Janual) 19Sl. 
Significant)). as the 1980 shiftv.·ork dispute developed. SEc·v \\ages en1plo)ees \\ere turning 
their attention to a reduced hours carnpaign \\'h ich. given the SECV's predilection for uniforn1 
en1ployn1ent conditions. \Vould l~ave the operators relativ~ly \VOrse off. 
7 A detailed tahk 'ho\\ ing .til wage" nd rei a th it~ mo\'~n1en ts over a I 0 Y'-'" r period to llJXO b a' ai ldhle 
on application to the author. 
X SIPS is a flat rate O\er uward payn1cnt gcdreLito )edr~ ol ~'-· rvu:e. It "a' introduced to enable the 
V•~tori,nl publi~ 'e~·tor to L·ornpL·te \\ith priYalc en1plo~cr!-\ in attracting and retaining ~uitabl~ 
4u~dified lahour. 
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In e sence then~ the operator \Vere in an exceUent strategic position and the unarrested 
deterioration in lheir pay and condit·ions relativity \Vith wages en1ployees provided a trong 
incentive for exerting industrial pre sure. Before they could act effectively the operators 
needed an effective voice \Vi thin the MOA or a separate organisational vehicle \\'ith \\'hich to 
participate in the federal industrial relations systern. 
The shiftwork disputes and the formation of a breakaway union 
Without the support of the MOA the operators had limited scope to reverse their 
deteriorating wages and conditions relativity. The strategy adopted. forming a breakaway 
union. \\'as not usually open to Australian workers. The AIMPE Latrobe Valley Sub-branch 
was refom1ed as a direct result of dissatisfaction with the MOA. 
With sotne 8000 n1e1nbers in the total SECV workforce of :!2 000. the MOA is the largest 
union and has the \Vide~;t coverage rights of the 24 unions \Vith n1embers in the SEC\'. The 
MOA also has overlapping coverage \Vith 1 other unions. the AIMPE and FEDFA. AIMPE 
has a narro\ver tnetnbership base than either the FEDFA or MOA: its n1en1hers con1e fron1 
thl? operator classifications of unit attendant assistant unit controller. unit controller and 
charge engineer. This specificity is the result of AIMPE being prin1arily a n1aritin1c union \\'ith 
longstanding links to the po\ver industl)'. Marine engineer appear to have \vorked in the 
power industry since its inception but. despite a continuing n1embership,AIMPE was inactive 
in the Latrobe Va11cy prior to 1977. There appear to he 2 principal reasons for rnarine 
engineers retnaining AIMPE n1en1bers on recruitrnent to the SECY. Historically. the 
sin1ilarity bet\veen the: technologic en1ployed in t.he n1aritin1e and pov.rer industries enabled 
enl!ineer to be n1obile bet\veen the~ industrie . Because tnanv engineer ... 1110\'Cd het'A'een 
~ - ~ 
eagoing and shore based cn1ployn1ent (Or\vished to rclain that option) they retained AlMPE 
n1en1berL hip. \Vithout \vhich ernp1oytnent on coastal or Au .. tralian nag oversea ,. shipping \vas 
unobtainable (Buckley. 1970. pp 113-15 and IS3-4). Additionally. during the 1960s. the 
cotnn1issioning of the giant Hazelwood po\ver tation led to an unprecedented :increase in 
labour r~quirernents. The shortf~tll \Vas 1net by rccruitn1ent frorn the United Kingdorn po\ver 
industry and atnong tnarinc engineers. Both groups \Vere reportedly reluctant to join the State 
Electricity Con1111ission of Victoria ,Officer ~ Association (SECYOA). the predecessor to the 
MOA SECV Branch (Lyon. 1983. p 2). Instead the operators ought to join narro\vly-based 
unions for technical personnel as occurred in the 'UK po\ver industl)' and the Australian 
111aritirne industry. oi ~satisfaction Vlith the broad cov~rage of the SECVOA and AIMPE's 
failun:: to repre ent it '"" SEC\' 1nen1bers \vere reflected in request for AIMPE to establish an 
a\vard for operator. (AIMPE. 1963). These entirnent led to the forn1ation of the Latrobe 
Valley Sub-branch of AIM PE in 1964. A\vard coverage \Vas achieved by default the follo\ving 
year \\'hen. as a union \Vith tnen1her~ in the SE~CY. AIMPE becan1e a party to the Municipal 
Officers Association ,(SEC\' ) A~vard 1965. Thu. lhe AIMPE Sub-branch \\HS fonncd to 
prov:ide separate representation for the opera lor but \vas paradoxically tied into an industry 
a \vard fro1n the outset. In the ensu in£! years the A IMP E Sub-branch d\vi ntHed inn u 111 her "' and 
... . 
activity levels. anti the MO.A continued to represent the rnajority of the operators despite 
continuing dissatisfaction. A fonner n1en1ber and activist in both AIMPE and MOA has 
~ 
ob crved: 
'The M~OA rnade cu ns idcrahk gains for 'their me1nh~rs in the late 1960s and early ll.J70s 
a nd the indus tria I n1uscle of the ta ff sh i ftworkcr ''as u~etl to bel p rna ke the~e gain~. 
however a lo t of th e e gain s ditl not go to lhc shift\\ orkcrs 0 -)011 . 19R3. p 3). 
In 1976. following pressure by the operators. the MOA. served clain1s on the SECY seeking 
in1proved shift work cond:itions. 1"he n1ajor clain1s v.rere: increased shift pren1iun1 . v.'eek-end 
and ovcrtin1e penalties~ inclusion of all allO\\'ances and penalties in overtin1e calculations: 
increased annual leave and optional early retircn1enl \Vith full benefit for shift\ovorkers. The 
cl:.tin1s \Vere r~jec lcd \Vith 2 n1inor exception . ~Cornhin~d n1cctings of AIMPE. FEOl---A and 
MOA responded to thi s \Vith an ullirnatu1n that if a ··satisfactory ans\Vt:r is not rccc·ivcd by 
7/ 1/77 a further tne·~ting \Vill be convened to consider direct action·· (MOA. l976).l'hc SEC."V 
di scounted tht: threat as ucxccutivc generated \Vith the support of a fc\V rnilitants .. ( E(~V. 
1976). In January 1977. the operators n1et again and decided to hold a 24 hour strike follov.rcd 
by \VOrk han s. On it s 0'\\'11 JllOtion the c·oncilialion and Arbitation Con1n1ission altt rnptt:d to 
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"'Cltlc the dispute b) putting forv.ard a 3 point proposal: a pri\ ate arbitration. the partie~ v,ai'c 
their rights to forn1al proceedings including appc'ah and deferral of intlustrial action. 
Industrial action seen1cd inevitable fo1lov;ing the SE('V r~jcc'lion ofthb prupo~al. Ho\\'C"\cr. 
\\hen lhc MOA Latrobe VaHc) ~hift\vorkcrs n1et in February 1977 they \Otcd to .. defer·· the 
stoppage but hrough t fot\va rd the i n1 posil ion of han~ { M OA. 1977 a). A It hough the deferral 
nHl) ha\c been based on tactical consideration!' at least "on1c of the operator~ perceived it a!" a 
betrayal by the MOA (Lyon. 19X3. p 3). l·hc in1n1int:ncc of hans led the Arbitration 
C'on1n1i~ ion to convt:ne a pri\ ate confercn~~ to consider a revised ~cttlcn1cnt propo. al. Again 
~10A a~tcd indcci~ively t~nd \\OUld ha\'c accepted the diluted scttlcn1ent propo~n1. but the 
Sl·( V rcn1aincJ intransigent st:cking urhitration of all clain1~.1 hi obduracy highlighted the 
indl·ci"ti\'cncs~ of the MOA lcadcr~hip and acted as a catal)~t forlhc secession of the n1ilitant 
operator~. J-ollov. ing. the failed senlctncnt proposaL a n1ceting of t\10A hift"·orkcr 'otcd to 
.. r~l:OI1111lcnd a 4/-hour stoppage of shirtv.orkcr to the MOA Executi\ c·· in protest (SI.:C'V. 
1977a). l)cspitc this re olution the Branch l.:xecuti\e opted to unt:onuitiona\ly lift the han~ 
and rcjcl·h:d further indu~trial action (MOA. 1977'b). This position \Vas also adopted by 
J·l:I)J"A. By nO\\ the operalor, .. isohttion \\(I~ ncarl) con1plcte: bolh their vie\\s and industrit~l 
ptl\~cr had h~cn ignored again. 
l·oll<H\ 'ing an SE,CV appJit:ation the ~hift\~·orkclain1s ~en~ arhitnl'lcd by a full bench of'thc 
Arbitration Con1n1ission "hit:h rejected thcn1. Responding to the decision. the MOA SEC.\/ 
Branch Sct:rctary predic'letl ··a 'irlu~tl ~hut do~n .. of the Latrobe Valley pO\\'Cr stations. 
ho~\cver. a n1cctinu ofn1en1bcr~ \\a~ not convened until15 June.\ I da)s after the decision ,,·a~ 
.... . 
h41ndcd d0\\'11 (ABC. National Nc~~~~. 1977). At this n1ccting 'lhe MOA c·on11nittee of 
Managcn1cnt rcconlnH:-nded thal ll1Cn1bcr~: 
taJ..:~ acl:ount oft he current poli'tical and ecunon1ic clilni:He. in deciding an) future cour~e of 
action and to he a\\ar,e the cxtrcn1c cour~c of tlirecl action necessary to O\l'rturn the full 
• 
bench dcdsion could lead lO the COillplcte i~olation of lhl' union h) the forces presently 
pur~uing a course designed to dc~tro) the trade union mo\en1cnt (t\1 ,0A. 1977c). 
A nurnhcr of the operators instead ctrgucd for an in1111~diate indclinit·C stoppage to force 
the SL~c·v to revise ·its po~ition. Arguably. the MOA had a responsihilty to Laution n1t:n1hers 
rcg.anling the possible consequences of strike action. especially in a critical induslry such as 
electricity generation. ho\vcvcr. its advice \\as tantan1ount to outright opposition. The dire 
''arnings of the omcial~ uccceded in that a n1otion proposing a national pO\\Cr inJustry 
l:an1paign and a report hack n1ceting .. to consider progrc!)s 1nade and the need for direct 
iH.:tion·· "a~ adopted h) a na .rTO\\ rnajoril) (SEC\1. 1977h). This 1narked a further stage in 
alienating the operator~ fron1 other MOA shift\vorkers and it broader n1cn1bcrship: it \\a a 
turning point 'in the fon11e:Hion of a breaka\\·ay union. For the fir!)t tin1c there ,,·as a public 
expression of the necessi 'ty to forrn a separate union for shift staff. J\'lso it v.a. reported a 
ntnnb~r of HaLch\·ood Pov~cr Station operators 'left ~lhc n1ceting 'in protest at lhe re~olution 
( s 1-. c· v. 1 91 7 h ) . 
l'hc MOA response to the full bench decision had L:on1pl~teJ the 'industrial isolation of the 
operators. l~hc proposed national can1paign \~as s~en as a divcr!'tion to further postpone 
industrial action. a il foHowct16 n1onth~ during\\ hich the MOA forestall~d act·ion designed 
to "help speed up proceedings and to shov. the full bcnth the IVlctnbcrship (sic) \\'as keen lo 
in1pn)\C their conditions .. (L)on. 19X3. p 3). Moreo,·er.th~ tnultiplicityofunions in the pO\\Cr 
intlustJ) and their preoccupation" ith 'ariou~ olher issue~ ~uch as shorter hours. con1hined 
\\ ith the absence of a ll'btory of joint national action. sugge~ted the proposed cutnpaign ''a" 
doon1cd to failure. Indeed .. these were just the sort of cons,idcrations underlying the 
fonnation of a breaka,,·av union. Prcdictabh. durin1r 197, MOA can1e no closer to a nalional 
... . ... 
carnpaign than n1eeting ''ith it~ interstate branche~ todrun a nutional hift,,ork logofclain1~ 
and rncctings '' ith other union~ further e\'idenced the itnpracticality of a national can1paign. 
()ne crncia'l ob .. tacle \\as that in Ne\v South \Vales and ~Queen~land the industt) \vas not 
• 
rcg\lllatcd by federal a'\vards and tho~c branches (state r~gistered unions) ,,·ere reluctant to 
cede their autonon1y. albeit in a lirnitcd "'"Y· 
Thu~. O\'~rthe period 1976-7X. events reached a stage ripe for the rorn1alion ora breaka\\ay 
union. (~onsc4ue ntly. and a ftcr son1c J i~cus~ions a n1ong the operators. AI rvi P E 'vas req uestcd 
to reform the Latrobe Valley Sub-branch and allO\\' the staff shifhvorkers to ··run ·their O\Vn 
unit>n alTair' \Vith the help of a ful1-1in1e official'· (L~on. '19R3. p 4). All\~PE accept~d thi~ 
proposition and in eiTccl did \\hat fc" other union~ h<n~ done- granted op~rat 'ional 
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au tonon1y to a group of n1e1n hers. For the n1o t part Australian unions altern pt to li rnit hranch 
autonon1y \vhereas the AIMPE Sub-branch \Vas given such latitude that it could en1bark on 
industrial action \Vithout approval fron1 the State or Federal levels of 'the union. The 
concession ofSub-hranch autonorny n1ay have been a pragn1atic atten1pt to offset a dwindling 
in rnen1ber~hip and revenue occasioned by the clecl ·ine of 'the Austra 'lian n1aritin1e industry 
(Melbourne Sun. 1980 .. p 46).1n any case this 1node of operation was not unfamiliar to AJMPE 
\Vith its far flung rnen1bership at sea being left to run their O\Vn affairs for long periods oftin1e. 
l~he refonncd AIMPE Sub-brnnch tnoved quickly to recrui! Latrobe Valley operators by 
tapping discontent atnong M·OA n1en1her ... It en1phasi ed that in representing a restricted 
range of classHical'ion the interest of one group \VOuld not be sacrificed to .. the veto of large 
groups of n1en1bers in other po ition . i.e. trade offs. back clo\vns and other con1pron1ises 
be·ing n1ade so as to protect the interests of persons not connected \\ith shift operations·· 
(AIMPE. 1977a). This \vas an unsubtle reference to MOA convened n1eetings ofshift\.vorkers 
\vhere lhe operators \Vere outvoted by day\\'Orker staff. 
Meetings of pov.rer induslry union continued during 1979 but .. lack of support for a 
national can1paign resulted in a decision to restricl action to Victoria.' By the end of the year 
MOA \Vas in a sin1ilar position to 1976: it vlas about to serve a :tog of clairns on behalf of 
shift\vorkers but this \Vas to b~ a joint unions ca1npaign focusing on AIMPE. FEDFA and 
MOA. This tin1e around there \vas one fundan1en1al difference: AIMPE had recruited 
slrongly an1ong the disaffected operator and the breakav.tay union represented the n1ajority 
of unit controllers. as istant unit controllers and charge engineers at the unitised po\ver 
stations. The ece sion and fonnation of the AlMPE Sub-branch tneant the operators'vie"'S 
had to be explicitly accounted for. Hence. AIMPE initially rnade .its participation conditional 
on i ncl us ion of a cla i 111 for earning .. -related shift pretn i u 111 .. . not just an ·increase in the existing 
nat rate sh'ift pren1iun1s. Subsequently AIMPE revised it position to include a nat rate 
cornponent but the MOA rejected th ·i as it did nol contain a n1inin1un1 paytnent to protect the 
earnings of lower classifications {AIMPE. 1979). 
In early 1980 AI MPE \Vas the only union keen to procet:cl \Vi th ash i ft\\'Ork log of clai:n1s: the 
FED FA and MOA \lvere preoccupied \Vith other industrial issues. The consequences of the 
resurreLtion of the Al"tvtPE Sub-branch no\v hecatne eviclent. l'he Sub-branch \Vas pressing 
the Victorian Branch officials to serve the clain1s and un'ilateral'lv undertake an industrial · 
-
can1paig:n. AIMPE responded and served the log on 2 ApriL on'ly to be follo\ved by MOA 2 
\Veeks later. Having pre-en1pted the other unions AlMPE indicated to F'EDFA and MOA that 
·it till favoured a joint carnpaign. In any case the clain1s '-J erved on the SE~CV \Vere aln1ost 
identical to the joint union , log fonnulatecl in 1979. As in 1977 the SECV rejected the clain1s 
relying upon ·its confonnity \Vith national standard and the force of the Arbitration 
Con11ni · ion dec·is·ion in the 1976-77 hiflv.rork di pute (ACAC. 1977). MOA n1et the rejection 
by proposing industrial action for late in May and the convening of a con1bined unions 
n1eeting to endorse that action (AIMPE. 1980). The AIM PE Sub-branch Executive rejected a 
con1bined unions n1eeting. referring to the operators· experience of being outvoted in the 1977 
dispute. Instead AIMPE again pre-etnpted M·OA by calling a n1eeting \Vhich \vould precede 
the MOA n1eeting and proposing industrial action at 1-lazelwood and Yallourn W. the 2 
station -- \vhere the n1ajority of operators \V~re i\IMPE n1en1bers (AJMPE. PJ80). 
In vie\v of the threatened industrial action the SECV notified the Arbitration Con1n1i .._ sion 
of an industrial dispute but proceedings \verc adjourned on the basi of an MOA subn1ission 
that it \Van ted to place ne\ .. , :n1ateriaJ before tht: SEC\1. The AIMPE Sub-branch re ponded by 
forestalling indu trial ac'lion pending lhe outcon1e of di '"cussions \Vith the SEC'V. These 
discussions \Vere abortive and industrial aLtion \Vas inevitable unless AIMPE resiled fron1 its 
threats as had the MOA in 1977. The breaka\vay union \Vas in a different situation. ho,vevt:r: 
the occupational hon1ogeneity of its tnernbers and the perceived in1portance of the shiftwork 
c'lain1s nrilitated againsl a retreat. l·he AIMPE Sub-branch n1ct and decided on a 
(purportedly) indefinite~ hutdo\vn of 1-Iazelv~'ood and ) ' allourn W f'O\Vcr lations beginning 
~3 June. A 5 day lead tin1e \Vas provided for M·OA to tneet and consider partici ·pation in the 
industria 'l action (AIMPE. 1980). Thu ''. despite its dt=sirt: ror a joint carnpaign. the AIMPE 
Sub-branch continued to force the pact' or events in an Hpparcnt atten1pt to fuHil'l the 
expectations of its tnen1ber'". 
On the eve oft he stoppage there \vere further clicussions \vilh the SECV and a hearing in 
Th.: shift work di!-tputc or 19XU i!-t d ·~a It'' it h on I) b:rien) hen.:: for an nrc dcta il secT cichcr ( 19X4. pp 3::! 1-
29). 
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the Arhitration ("on1n1ission. The hearing only highlighted the difference~ bct\\cen the 
J-\IMPI: anti MOA and under~o,cored the fact that the other unions repr~~cnting ptn\·cr 
indu~try Clllplo)ee~ \\'C!'t: sati~fied vvith nat rate shift pn.:nliunls (A("A(·. 19XO. p 43). 
Mean\'- hi leo the MOA and I·I : IJFA n1cn1bcrs n1ct in the l.atrohc \'aile\ and rc~olved to 
-
.. ~upport the action oft he AIM PI:.:· (AC'AC'. ll)RO. p 59). Such \\i.lS the indirect pressure exerted 
h) AIMP 'I· that the MOA official~ ~hil'tcd fron1 their prcv1ou~ position oppos·ing indu~trial 
actionlo adopt·ing the AIM PI: ~tancc of seeking an offer and not sin1ply an agreed settlcn1cnt 
prot:edurc (Melbourne Age. 19XO. p 9). On the second day oft he ensuing 4 day stoppage the 
~1C)A con\cncd a co1nhin~d nl~~ting of ~hift\\Orkcr~ hut AIMPI· refus~d to participah:. 
i\llno~t b~ default ~1 OA n:gai n~d h~iH.l~r~h i p oft he di~pute rl!~oh i ng to continue the stoppage 
,u1d ~xtcnd it to the old~r) allourn (·. I) and F po\\t:r stations. the n1ain concentration~ of 
MOA op~rator~. l"'he AIM PI · had 1itt1c choice but to udopt this n.:~olution. '"'ith the re~tdtanl 
deterioration in (10\\Cr '-.Uppl~. the Arbitration c·ot11111i'-tsion rct:Oil\ened \\lth the ~tatcd 
inh:ntion ol referring thl' di"putc to a full bench. The likel) unsuccc~~ful outcon1c of a full 
bcn(h arbitration oft he clain1" uppcar~ to ha\c pro\ idcd a !'ufficicnt ~1i1nulus for an alt·cad) 
~..:hcdulcd n1ceting of union~ n.:pn:~cnting Sl:c·v shift\\orkcrs to produce a general fonnu1a 
for I'C~t1111ing \VOrk \\'lthOUl agn.:CI11CIH on 'the forn1 of shift prerniun1s.l~hi~ ror111Uia. providing 
for a \Vork;ng party cxan1ination or shift,vork. \Vas ac~cptcd by the SECV. Ahhough the 
propo~al contained no ~pc~ific ~oncc~~ion' th~ rcl~rcncc loan operative date and pro\'i~ion 
for a "'ing.lc ( " on1n1is~ioncr to dc~idl: the 'hifl pretniunl clain1 \\ere 4\ignificant if intangible 
gains "''hen contrasted \Vith events in 1977. Son1e\vhat surplisingly. executive tnernhers of the 
AIMPE Sub-branch. along \\1ith FEDFA and 'MOA oflicials. agreed to endor e the proposals 
at a con1bined union~ n1ecting. Thi~ rnceting accepted the ''orking party proposal huL not 
'"·ithout prolonged debate and signilicant division . Foi10\\'ing a rcsurnption of '"'ork. 
prot:ccding~ ~hif'lcd into the \\Orking part) fonnat and the l·lain1'\ for increased shift 
pn!n1iun1s anJ \\Cekend and public holida~ penalties \\'ere uhi .rnatel) arbitrated. The clairn~ 
for incrca~ed penalties \\ere r~fused hut ~hif't pren1iun1~ \\er~ increased hy 37 percent and the 
llat rate payn1cnt \\a retained. l)cspit~ thi. lhe operators could clain1 that at least their vie\\'S 
rc~tllln:d lllOI'C pr0111incntly than hitherto. 
l)iscussion 
In reccnl )ear~ there ha~ been a continuing current of public support for union 
<.11nalganuuion~. that is. for a reduction in the nurnber of uni<.Hl"' h) a proce~s of n1crger into 
i nJustJ) st) lc union . Thi!\ ath ocacy has con1c fron1 a \'a ri~t) or qua rtcrs. cn1 plo) cr 
a~~ociHtions. corporate executi\e5. the Auslralian (~ouncil of 'TnuJe l Jnions. the Australian 
Labor Part). and go\ernnH.~nt inquiries. Most recently the rncrger proce'\s n:cehed strong 
'»L1ppo11 ·in the Report of the ( ·on1n1ittec ofRc\icv. into Au~tralian lndu~trial 'Relation~ La\\ 
and S) stenls (Hancock Report). Th~ principal reCOJ11111Clldations of the c·onlnlittce \\en: thnl. 
unions " 'i'lh lc~~ than I 000 n1C111hcr~ should he dcregi~tercd except in ~pccial circun1stance~. 
craft or occupational union!'\ b~ ·precluded fron1 federal rcgi!'\lrat.ion in future. and the 
rcquin~n1cn1 that a specified proportion of union n1en1hcrs 1nu~t 'otc ~or "n arnalgarnation 
ballot tosuc~ccd. he replaced wi'th on~defin ·inga tnajori'ly(C'onln1ittceofRcvie\v.19R5.1ll.pp 
~~-:~4) . 1'" hc C'on11n i uec further ~tatcd th~re an.~ .. too 111 an) associ a lion~ or ctn ployee · registered 
and operating v.ithin Australia .. cau~ing 3 1nain prohh:-n1"': dis~ipation of union rcsour~c'. 
inter-union contlicl and .. the difficultie!\ that can ari~c in the re,olution or dispute"\\ hen 
cnlplo)crs arl.· obliged to deal \\ilh a \\ide \ariel~ of unions. each perhaps \\ilh different 
ohj~cli\CS and cxpcclations"'" (C.onl'lnilll'C or Re\iC\\. 14X5. H. p 461). 
1-hc continuing existence of a large nun1ber of ~rnall union~. IHl\\C\Cr. highlight~ the 
irrcle\anc~ of pro-an1alganHrtion sentin1cnts lO the bulk of union nH:n1bcr~ . l~he situation in 
the \ fictorian pO\\Cr industi) \\'ith a n1ulliplicit) of union~ is instructi\'c in thi~ regard. The 
MOA, " ·ith coverage rights over a '"'ide range or clas~ifications. "as ~ccn as ha\ 1ng neglected 
the interests Of at leasl 011C group or t11CI11ber~. J10\VCr Station Operators. 1-raditionall) the 
operators had recei' ed superior \"·age~ nnd condition~ or en1ployn1ctH to :n1ost Sl:.(,V 
en1ployces. During the 1970s panicularl). their position v .. a~ undern1incd. Prior to th~ 
introduction of\vage indexation in 1975 National \Vage ( ·asc dcci~ions frequently a\\'ardcd 
ahsolute ~11nounts or contained an ab~olute cornponent. In addition. int:reascd over a\\'an.l 
pu~ 1n~nt~ received by other crnplo) ee~ \\ere not incorporated into the paid rates cl\~anJ olthc 
operator~. Fu11her distortion of rctati' itie~ occurred during the period of \\ag~ indexalion 
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1975-81 \vhen the Arbitration 'Cornn1ission atternptecl to reduce the wage share in national 
incon1e by plateau wage indexation. These pressures were compounded by actual or 
in1pendi ng i1nprovernents in the non-\vage benefits received by SECV wages employees. 
The operators
1 
dissatisfaction \Vas exacerbated by the MOA~s perceived failure to 
adequately pursue their sect.ional interests. A crucial episode was the shiftwork dispute of 
1976-77 \vhen cla .in1s \Vcre n1ade on behalf oflhe operators and their rejection by the SEC'V 
resulted in no n1ore than threats of induslrial action. The MOA was seen as continuing to 
neglect the operators \vhen no industrial retaliation follo,vcd, rejection of the c.lain1s by the 
Arbitration Con1rni · ion. This equence of events rc ultcd in key figure an1ong the pow·er 
tation operators negotiating for a large group of operator to secede from MOA and transfer 
rnen1bership to AIMPE in return for autonon1y. The attraction of AIMPE \\'as that as a 
federally registered union it enabled the operators to participate in the federal industrial 
relation sy ten1 \VithotH AIMPE exerting any obvious control over this section of it 
n1en1bership. Indeed. AJMPE recruited on the basis that it would respond to the operators· 
sectional interc ts \Vit houl having to consider the interests of other sections of its n1e1n her hip. 
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